In Discourses 2.11, Epictetus gives his account of the origins of philosophy. 

The beginning of philosophy is this: the being sensible of the disagreement of men with each other; an inquiry into the cause of this disagreement; and a disapprobation and distrust of what merely seems; a careful examination into what seems, whether it seem rightly; and the discovery of some rule which shall serve like a balance, for the determination of weights; like a square, for distinguishing straight and crooked….

Is it possible that all things which seem right to all persons are so? Can things contradictory be right? We say not all things; but all that seem so to us. And why more to you than to the Syrians or Egyptians; than to me, or to any other man? Not at all more.

Therefore, what seems to each man is not sufficient to determine the reality of a thing; for even in weights and measures we are not satisfied with the bare appearance, but for everything we find some rule. And is there, then, in the present case no rule preferable to what seems? Is it possible that what is of the greatest necessity in human life should be left incapable of determination and discovery?

There must be some rule…. Afterwards, beginning from certain known and determinate points, we may make use of general principles, properly applied to particulars.

…Is it fit to trust to anything unstable? No. Is pleasure, then, a stable thing? No. Take it, then, and throw it out of the scale, and drive it far distant from the place of good things….. This is the part of philosophy, to examine, and fix the rules; and to make use of them, when they are known, is the business of a wise and good man.

This account seems reasonable, but is it really so? Let’s review the main points.

• There is disagreement among philosophers.

• A rule must exist to determine who is right. 

• That rule must be something stable.

• Proper use of the rule makes one a wise and good person.

In this short passage, Epictetus draws the main distinctions between Stoicism and its main philosophical rivals, Epicureanism, and the two schools of skepticism: the Pyrrhonists and the Academics. 

The Epicureans agree with Epictetus that there’s a rule. They say this rule is based on pleasure and pain. With a proper understanding of pleasure and pain, one can make wise and good decisions. 

Epictetus rejects the Epicurean argument with an argument that is uncanny similar to the Buddhist Three Marks of Existence. The Buddha said that all compound things are impermanent (anicca). Because of this, they are unstable and unsatisfactory (dukkha). As it is not fit to trust anything unstable, no compound thing (e.g., pleasure) has self-essence (anatta). 

Epictetus here rejects pleasure and pain as a guide for the same reason the Buddha did: pleasure and pain are unstable and therefore unsatisfactory for serving as the rule. Whether that’s convincing or not is disputed. Epictetus merely asserts that pleasure is inherently unstable. The Epicureans don’t agree. They think that ataraxia and aponia are a stable pleasure - i.e., the absence of mental disturbance and physical pain represents a stable point allowing for a rule based on pleasure.

Similarly, Epictetus’ argument against the Pyrrhonists and Academic Skeptics is also just an assertion: “there must be some rule.”

Why must there be a rule?

Here Epictetus starts with an intuitively appealing assumption that leads his thinking down a slippery slope. This slippery slope looks like this, starting with an assumption that such a truth-providing rule must be out there.

Once one believes that the rule must be out there, one starts seeing a rule - whether it exists or not. This is the next stage:

Once one sees said rule, then one wants to cling to that rule. This stage looks like: 

Epictetus wants to believe that there’s a rule, and that he has that rule - a rule that makes him a wise and good man. 

Epictetus can’t be blamed for wanting to be a wise and good man. He can’t be blamed for looking for decision-making rules that would allow him to do so. His fault is something that the Buddhists describe as grasping and clinging. He grasps a rule that isn’t there. Now that he thinks he has that rule, he clings to it.

This grasping and clinging appears to be human nature. The economist Bryan Kaplan gives a splendid example of how his students fall into this trap, in which they grasp whatever rule that seems like it must be there even when it’s clear that there’s no applicable rule - or as Kaplan describes it here, no applicable model. 

… when grading economics exams, I often notice a serious downside of studying economics: Many econ students literally get detached from reality…. What I mean is: I ask a question about the real world.  The question even contains the phrase, “In the real world…”  Then instead of discussing the real world, many economics students tell me about a model they learned in class.  Sometimes their answers even contain the phrase, “Assume model X.”

For example, an exam question might ask, “What determines the price of water when two individuals bump into each other in a remote desert?”  Many economics students will then start talking about supply and demand, or even state, “Assume perfect competition.  Then blah blah blah.” 

This wouldn’t be so bad if the students would at least argue that, contrary to appearances, the perfectly competitive model applies.  But when students take a model for granted despite the violation of its core assumptions – such as no individual has any noticeable effect on the market price – something has gone terribly wrong.

Learning how to logically analyze hypothetical social situations is a great skill.  Economists should proudly teach it.  But mastering this skill can and often does melt students’ brains.  Before studying economics, no one would imagine that you can discuss models in lieu of discussing the real world.  After studying economics, I’m sorry to say, many students tacitly embrace this absurdity. 

Kaplan here describes how this assumption that there must be a rule warps thinking:

• Detachment from reality.

• Rash assumptions. 

• Disregard for appearances. 

• Absurd results.

Epictetus falls into the trap that Kaplan’s students fall into. He’s convinced himself that he has some rule that he can apply. 

Elsewhere in Discourses 2.11, Epictetus says that the rule he is talking about is about good and evil. He argues that we all come into the world with a preconception that good and evil exist. The issue at hand is that what seems good to one person seems bad to another. Epictetus insists that one must come “to some stronger ground than seeming.” In other words, Epictetus believes he knows what is truly good and what is truly evil. 

As Carl Jung put it, “People don’t have ideas. Ideas have people.”

Epictetus has been had.